Welcome to City Shift Finance Hotel Finance Explained, our third podcast. Our other shows are Revenue Management Conversations with Amber, and City Shift Finance Insights with Josh, our Director of Strategy. Here, AI voices narrate our team's published hotel research, to help listeners better understand the financial concepts. For those wondering about City Shift Finance, we are a management consulting firm focused on financial performance, revenue, and profitability, to create real impact.
So it is wild to think about losing just $1 out of every $100 you make at the top line, but then somehow your bottom-line profit just drops by more than $7.
It really is. I mean, people often have this expectation that the path between revenue and profit is completely linear and straightforward, right? But for the hotel owners, asset managers, and CFOs listening right now, well, you already know the truth. Reading an income statement is not about just admiring the totals.
No, not at all. It is a forensic exercise. It is how you track exactly where your profit is leaking out of the property.
Exactly, which brings us to the mission for today's deep dive. We are tearing into a real fiscal 2025 case study of hotel profit margins.
Yeah, fascinating.
Our subject today is a specific, unnamed US hotel owner. And according to its February 26, 2026 SEC filing, this company has 92 premium-branded, rooms-oriented, urban-centric hotels.
Got it. So the goal today is to examine exactly how a tiny revenue decline managed to cascade into a massive profit drop for this portfolio.
To do that effectively, though, we have to establish the strict ground rules for this deep dive.
Right, the boundaries.
Right. We are operating exclusively within the boundaries of the source material. We will use only the figures published by the company, alongside specific published research and calculations from City Shift Finance.
Nothing outside those lines.
Exactly. We also need to emphasize up front that Comparable Hotel EBITDA is the company's own measure.
Yes. And to really understand those comparable results, you have to know that the company sold three hotels in 2025.
Right. They sold one in March and two in December.
Right. So that obviously impacts how you view their comparable results versus their reported income statements. We will be tracking that distinction closely as we go.
That distinction is crucial. Because well before you can analyze the dollar figures on an income statement, you must establish the property-level operating environment that generated them.
Makes sense. So we need to look at the comparable operating statistics for the full year 2025 compared to 2024.
Let's look at that operating environment. The comparable operating statistics show revenue per available room, or RevPAR, sitting at $143.49, compared with $146.05. That is down 1.7%.
Yeah. And when you break that RevPAR down into its components, the average daily rate, or ADR, was $200.39 compared with $201.04, which is down 0.3%. Occupancy was 71.6% compared with 72.6%.
Hold on. I need to stop you there. A one-point drop in occupancy and a 1.7% decline in RevPAR is barely a tremor.
Barely. When we look at the absolute dollars in the comparable results, comparable hotel revenue was $1,332.8 million in 2025 and $1,345.9 million in 2024.
Right. That is about $1.33 billion and $1.35 billion. That top-line revenue drop is just 1%.
The top-line decline is indeed just 1%. So how on earth does comparable hotel revenue falling just 1% translate to Comparable Hotel EBITDA falling 7.3%?
Well, I mean, the profit went from $392 million down to $363.5 million. A rounding error at the top line triggering this massive drop at the bottom line. The math just feels completely disconnected.
It feels that way, yeah, but the math is entirely connected. Identifying the core shift answers your question. Comparable Hotel EBITDA margin moved from 29.1% down to 27.3%.
Wow. That is a drop of 185 basis points, or 1.85 percentage points. So the margin compressed. But, you know, simply observing that a margin shrank is only step one of an operating review.
Exactly. If you are an asset manager staring at this, you need to understand exactly where that profit went. You have to isolate the variables.
And to isolate those variables, we turn to published research from City Shift Finance. And I need to explicitly state that the calculations we are about to walk through are City Shift Finance calculations.
Right. They are not figures the company reports.
Okay, so applying the City Shift Finance calculations to the absolute dollars, we see Comparable Hotel EBITDA fell $28.5 million. That profit drop is more than twice the revenue decline of $13.1 million.
Which means the decline is mathematically a two-part equation.
How so?
When you take the revenue and subtract the Hotel EBITDA, you find the comparable hotel costs before Hotel EBITDA.
Okay.
Those costs rose to about $969.3 million in 2025, compared with about $953.9 million in 2024.
So while the top-line revenue was shrinking, costs before Hotel EBITDA increased by about $15.4 million.
Yes. Therefore, the total profit decline is two parts: about $13.1 million of lost revenue, plus about $15.4 million of higher cost.
Actually raises a strictly theoretical mathematical question based on the City Shift Finance reports.
What is that?
What would the profit have been if the company had simply maintained its 2024 margin on the lower level of 2025 revenue? Like if they had just held the line at 29.1%?
It is a great question. Had they kept the 2024 margin of 29.1% on that 2025 revenue, Comparable Hotel EBITDA would have been about $387.8 million.
Wow. That is about $24.3 million more than reported. $24 million more just by holding the margin flat on a slightly smaller revenue base. It perfectly illustrates the financial weight of a single margin point.
Yeah, it really does. The City Shift Finance calculations emphasize that at this specific revenue level, each one percentage point of margin equals about $13.3 million of Hotel EBITDA a year.
One single percentage point is worth $13.3 million. When the stakes are that high, tracking down that $15.4 million in higher costs becomes urgent.
Absolutely. To do that, our analysis has to shift away from the comparable numbers and over to the reported income statement. And here we must note clearly that this reported income statement includes the sold hotels for the period they were owned. It is a slightly different data set than the comparable figures we just examined.
Let's dissect this reported income statement, starting with the largest driver, which is the rooms department.
Yeah. Room revenue fell about $28.3 million. It came in at $1,093.3 million, compared with $1,121.6 million. But while that room revenue was falling, room expense actually rose. Room expense was $293.4 million, compared with $288.6 million. That is an increase of about $4.8 million.
So revenue goes down $28.3 million. Expense goes up $4.8 million. The mechanical result of those two movements is that rooms departmental profit was about $799.9 million compared with about $833 million.
Exactly. The rooms departmental margin dropped to about 73.2% from about 74.3%.
The rooms department lost margin from both directions. But, you know, when you look at the other departments, the movement shifts.
Okay, let's look.
Food and beverage revenue rose. It was $158.2 million compared with $153.1 million.
And the expense?
Yeah. Food and beverage expense also rose, coming in at $119.8 million, compared with $117.8 million. So because the revenue growth outpaced the expense growth in that specific department, the food and beverage margin actually rose.
Right. About 24.3% from 23.1%.
Right. We also have other revenue on the statement, which was $98.4 million compared with $94.7 million.
Okay, when you compile the total picture outside of the rooms department, overall revenue outside rooms rose by about $8.7 million. It went to about $256.6 million from about $247.9 million.
So non-rooms revenue rose by about $8.7 million, while room revenue fell by about $28.3 million.
Yes. Now let's walk through the remaining lines on this reported statement, moving down into the broader expenses and fees. Management and franchise fee expense fell about $5.2 million.
Okay. It was $102.8 million compared with $108 million.
Moving down, total property operating expenses rose about $9.6 million.
Right. That line was $887.5 million, compared with $877.9 million. Within that total, other operating expenses rose about $7.9 million, sitting at $371.6 million compared with $363.6 million.
And finally, there is the property tax, insurance, and other line. That line fell about $5.7 million, coming in at $101.3 million, compared with $107 million.
And we should note here that the company stated their fourth quarter fixed expenses included $4.7 million of real estate tax credits.
Right. So those are the exact components of the reported income statement, but reading the directional movement of these numbers reveals some glaring tensions.
The glaring tensions are important.
Putting it mildly.
Yeah. The math is clear, but it defies basic logic. If you are a CFO reading this, your alarm bells are ringing.
Oh, definitely. Why would room expenses rise when room revenue is actively falling? Why would other operating expenses rise when overall revenue is down? And what explains the rest of the drop in property tax and insurance beyond that $4.7 million credit?
This is where we hit the strict limits of the data.
Yeah. The filing simply does not explain these movements. It gives you the numbers, but it does not tell you why they moved the way they did.
It is a blank wall. And because this income statement leaves those critical why questions completely unanswered, we have to turn to the company's own explanation of the year while maintaining strict analytical boundaries.
Right. Looking strictly at the source filing, the chief executive stated the company achieved solid fourth quarter results that came in ahead of our outlook despite a choppy operating environment that was further constrained by a protracted government shutdown.
Right. The company specifically cited the extended US government shutdown, which began on October 1, 2025.
Yes. They noted it disrupted demand that they had expected in October and November. That is the operational constraint they identified. They also provided an outlook for 2026. They noted comparable RevPAR growth of 0.5% to 3% and Comparable Hotel EBITDA of $344 million to $374 million.
Management points to a solid fourth quarter relative to their internal outlook while navigating a government shutdown. But as we comb through the rest of the filing, the gaps in the data remain massive.
We have to systematically list what this document fails to establish.
The omissions dictate the limits of your review. The release does not give a specific reason for the full-year decline in RevPAR or margin.
Okay. Second, it does not report gross operating profit. Third, it does not break labor cost out as a separate line. It also does not give a room count.
And because the release lacks comparable departmental expenses, those departmental margins can only be calculated from the reported income statement, which, as we established earlier, includes the sold properties for the part of the year they were owned.
Exactly. Acknowledging the extreme limitations of this SEC filing naturally pivots our discussion to how the industry structurally reviews performance.
How so?
Because when the SEC filing stops giving answers, you have to rely on deeper structural frameworks, specifically using gross operating profit, or GOP.
Got it. To understand that framework, we look to the City Shift Finance report titled Hotel GOP Margin Benchmarks by Property Type.
All right. This published research maps out exactly how a hotel's GOP margin is created.
Under the City Shift Finance report, a hotel's GOP margin is created through the revenue retained after direct department costs and property-wide operating expenses.
Okay. It establishes that rooms revenue provides the primary operating base.
Yeah. Food and beverage, events, parking, spa, resort fees, and ancillary income shape the property's total revenue mix.
That covers the revenue and direct costs, but then you hit the undistributed expenses.
The City Shift Finance analysis outlines that administrative and general, sales and marketing, property operations and maintenance, and energy, water, and waste are all reviewed against current revenue.
And this is where the mechanics of that profit drop finally come into focus. Also, under the industry standard Uniform System of Accounts for the Lodging Industry, management fees and insurance are reported below GOP.
The City Shift Finance report explicitly notes that fixed cost gives this group particular weight during low-demand periods.
Fixed cost weight. That is a fundamental mathematical reality. If you want to review the structural framework yourself, the City Shift Finance report on Hotel GOP Margin, City Shift Finance work on increasing hotel GOP, and the original SEC filing are all linked on the episode page and in the description.
Understanding that GOP structure is essential. It dictates how you manage a property when the top line begins to erode.
And that leads us to the ultimate lesson of this deep dive. When you are confronted with an income statement where a tiny top-line revenue decline cascades into a significant profit drop, the next operating review begins with the line responsible for the movement. A one-point margin change has a direct annual financial value. Each material variance must be quantified against revenue and assigned to an accountable owner.
Thank you for listening. The original City Shift Finance research and supporting sources are linked in the episode description. For conversations with our team, listen to Revenue Management Conversations with Amber, and City Shift Finance Insights with Josh.
